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ABSTRACT
Rice self-sufficiency is an important programme in Indonesia. The 
programme has four major targets, i.e. increasing production, stabilizing 
prices and reserve stocks, and minimizing import. For that purpose, the 
government gave a mandate to a parastatal, namely National Logistic 
Agency (Bulog) in implementing the rice policies. Some studies 
found that involvement of such a parastatal could lead to government 
failure in budget allocation. The study aimed to estimate social cost of 
rice self-sufficiency programme based on the implementation of rice 
instrument policies by Bulog. The study used the national annual data 
of 2002–2014 period. The method used was the political preference 
function model to estimate economic rent and dead-weight loss using 
rice price elasticity of demand and supply. The result showed that in 
terms of percentage of food security budget, the average of economic 
rent reached IDR 6.37 trillion per annum (18.54%), while the average of 
dead-weight loss amounted at IDR 0.90 trillion per annum (2.34%). It 
proved that rice self-sufficiency programme along with the involvement 
of Bulog was economically inefficient. The government should provide 
better agricultural infrastructure, review governmental procurement 
prices, and stop rice import policy to remedy market failure.
[Keywords: budget, policy, rice, self-sufficiency]
ABSTRAK
Program swasembada beras merupakan program penting di Indonesia. 
Program tersebut mempunyai empat target utama, yaitu peningkatan 
produksi, stabilisasi harga dan cadangan beras pemerintah, serta 
penghentian impor. Guna mencapai tujuan tersebut, pemerintah 
memberi mandat kepada badan usaha milik negara, yaitu Bulog untuk 
melaksanakan kebijakan perberasan. Banyak kajian menemukan bahwa 
keterlibatan badan usaha semacam Bulog dapat memicu kegagalan 
pemerintah dalam mengalokasikan pendanaan. Pengkajian ini 
bertujuan untuk mengestimasi biaya sosial dari program swasembada 
beras berdasarkan pelaksanaan instrumen kebijakan beras oleh Bulog. 
Data yang digunakan merupakan data tahunan pada tingkat nasional 
periode 2002–2014. Pengkajian menggunakan model fungsi preferensi 
politik untuk mengestimasi rente ekonomi dan kesejahteraan sosial yang 
hilang dengan menggunakan nilai elastisitas harga dari permintaan 
dan penawaran beras. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa rata-rata 
rente ekonomi yang timbul mencapai Rp6,37 triliun per tahun atau 
18,54% dari dana ketahanan pangan, sedangkan kesejahteraan sosial 
yang hilang rata-rata Rp0,90 triliun per tahun atau 2,34% dari dana 
ketahanan pangan. Hal ini membuktikan bahwa program swasembada 
beras yang melibatkan Bulog dalam pelaksanaannya secara ekonomi 
tidak efisien. Pemerintah perlu menyediakan infrastruktur pertanian 
yang lebih baik, mengkaji ulang harga pembelian pemerintah, dan 
menghentikan impor beras guna meredam kegagalan pasar.
[Kata kunci: beras, dana, kebijakan, swasembada]
INTRODUCTION
Rice self-sufficiency policy is an important part of 
agricultural development programme in Indonesia 
(Baharsjah et al. 2014). Therefore, the government 
implements policy instruments to achieve self-
sufficiency targets, i.e. to increase the national 
production, to stabilize the domestic prices and reserve 
stocks, and to minimize the import. For that reasons, 
the government intervenes the domestic rice market 
by implementing rice policy instruments. In addition, 
the government involves a parastatal, namely National 
Logistic Agency or Bulog to execute the rice policy 
instruments along with the implementation of rice-self 
sufficiency programme. 
From the economic perspectives, self-sufficiency 
policy is inefficient (Barker and Hayami 1976), and 
being burden to the economy (Hutagaol 2017). The 
objective of such policy to increase rice production 
will imply on budget allocation. Therefore, some 
criticisms appeared assessing the programme. 
Involvement of Bulog in implementation of the rice 
policy instruments lead to the government failure, 
especially in budget allocation (Wambua et al. 2005; 
Zvavahera and Ndoda 2014) because operational 
activities of the parastatal is funded by the government 
(McCulloch and Timmer 2008). Hence, involvement 
of Bulog to accomplish the price stabilization and 
import policy received criticisms.
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  Bulog conducts buying and selling activities likewise 
the general rice traders, but Bulog uses the governmental 
prices. Moreover, Bulog manages the government 
reserve-stocks that come from domestic procurement 
and import of medium-quality rice. The general rice 
traders are not allowed to import medium-quality rice. 
Therefore, both instrument policies are concerned as 
privilege for Bulog because those are not given to the 
others. Such policy may trigger rent-seeking activities 
of the related one that have an impact on inefficiency 
of the programme and is concerned as the social cost 
of the policy. In addition, Bulog distributes rice for 
the poor (Raskin) as a subsidy to the poor family and 
this is concerned as the distribution activity. Moreover, 
during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, the 
distribution of Raskin tended to increase. Therefore, it is 
crucially necessary to investigate the effectiveness of the 
pro-poor policy. 
Because of the reason above, the criticisms come 
regarding the inefficiency issue and rent-seeking 
activities in accordance with the implementation of rice 
self-sufficiency programme and involvement of Bulog in 
the programme. However, none of the criticisms come 
with quantitative data to prove their arguments. Many 
studies related to rice self-sufficiency programme have 
been conducted, but there was no empirical one that 
could provide quantitative data to support the criticisms 
on self-sufficiency programme and involvement of 
Bulog. A political economic study was then conducted to 
prove the criticisms. The study aimed to estimate social 
cost of rice self-sufficiency programme along with the 
implementation of price instrument policies and import 
policy by Bulog.
METHODOLOGY
Time, Location and Data Collection
This study was conducted in 2016 using secondary 
data on the national level of Indonesia. The average of 
annual data started from 2002 to 2014 consisting of rice 
market data and macroeconomic indicators. The data 
comprised of domestic rice production (kg), national 
rice consumption (kg), nominal consumer rice price, 
nominal consumer price of rice substitute, i.e. maize 
(kg), consumer price index, nominal producer rice price 
(IDR kg-1), producer price index, milling cost of medium 
rice (IDR kg-1), CIF import price (IDR kg-1), import tariff 
of rice (IDR/kg), governmental procurement price (IDR 
kg-1), sale price of rice (IDR kg-1), tonage of Bulog’s 
rice procurement and distribution (kg), and tonage of 
imported rice (kg). 
The macroeconomic indicators comprised of real 
national income per capita (IDR), exchange rate of 
rupiah to US dollar (IDR/USD), and import tariff of rice. 
Besides, the budget of food security (IDR) was used 
as the approach of the budget of rice self-sufficiency 
programme. The sources of the data were the BPS- 
Statistics Indonesia, the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI), 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance, 
Republic of Indonesia.
Political Weight Estimation
The role of the government in agricultural sector 
is being the regulator, subsidy provider and tax 
collector (Ortiz 1999). The government intervenes 
the commodity market to allocate the resources by 
implementing policy instruments to achieve the targets 
of the policy. In which, political preference of the 
government is very important in formulating the policy 
(Swinnen and Zee 1993), because in a commodity 
market there are many vested interest groups involved 
in the market (Barret 1999). Political preference of the 
government to the vested interest groups is indicated 
by the political weight. Furthermore, political weight 
indicates the lobbying power of vested interest groups. 
During policy formulating process, the vested interest 
groups compete each other to influence the policy 
maker in order to get benefit from the policy (Rausser 
and Roland 2009). 
By hypothesis that the government as the policy 
maker has a welfare function with subject to a certain 
political weight of each vested interest group, for 
example the producer, consumer, and tax payer, 
comprising a simple political preferential function is 
as follows (Johnson 1995): 
W = w
p
.G
p
 + wc.Gc – wt.Lt                                                           (1)
Where wp, wc and wt are political weights of the 
producer, consumer and tax payer, while Gp, Gc, and 
Lt are the welfare resulted from the policy. To stabilize 
the domestic price, the government applies price support 
policy. This policy will give benefit to the producer and 
consumer, while the tax payer will get loss (Figure 1). 
The loss of the tax payer is showed by ABE area and 
known as dead-weight loss (DWL). The welfare function 
of the price support policy related to the self-sufficiency 
programme can be defined as follows:
W = (wp-wt) Gp + (wc-wt) Gc – wtDWLt                                        (2)
where, 
P0EAPs = Gp       = the change of producer surplus
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P0EBPd = Gc       = the change of consumer surplus
PsABPd = Lt       = the loss of tax payer
EAB     = DWLt = dead-weight loss
The approach above assumes that the policy formulating 
process can be explained through a mathematical 
problem, where the government is going to maximize a 
welfare function that consists of any welfare of the vested 
interest groups (Bullock 1994).
Price Elasticity Estimation
This study was conducted using a political preferential 
function model to illustrate the objective of the 
government of Indonesia to maximize social welfare 
of the producer, consumer and government in the 
rice market. The analysis was started by testing the 
variables integration order. It used the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller’s unit root test. The only stationary 
and free ones from unit root were then used in the 
following step, i.e. estimation of rice demand and 
supply relation. 
Since the analysis focused on the involvement 
of Bulog in rice procurement and distribution in 
the domestic market, hence the other traders were 
assumed as another group as non-Bulog. As a result, 
the market structure of domestic rice was assumed 
as an oligopoly market. For that reason, a dynamic-
oligopoly model adopted from Bresnahan (1982) 
and Lau (1982) that had been modified by Steen and 
Salvanes (1999) was then utilized to estimate the 
rice demand and supply relation. Since Bulog only 
conducted procurement and distribution of medium-
quality rice, therefore, this study focused on this rice 
category and excluded the premium rice imported by 
the registered importers that might come from the 
general rice traders.
The dynamic-oligopoly model of demand (Equation 
3) and supply relation (equation 4) was then used 
to estimate the elasticity of demand (equation 5 
and 6) and supply (equation 8 and 9). Afterwards, 
the generated economic rent and dead-weight loss 
based on the implementation of the price policy and 
import policy were calculated using equation 10 and 
11. The value of the economic rent and DWL were 
then transformed into percentage of the budget and 
concerned as the social cost of the programme.
∆Qdt = α0 + αp d∆Pdt + αY∆Yt + αZ∆Zt + αPY∆PYt 
+ α
PZ
∆PZt + αQd∆Qdt-1+ γ[Qdt-1 - Ɵpd Pdt-1 - 
ƟYYt-1- ƟZZt-1- ƟPYPYt-1 - ƟPZPZt-1] + αDDt + 
Ut                                                                                                                      (3)
Equation 3 is the dynamic-oligopoly rice demand model, 
where
Qd   =  rice demand (kg),
Pd    =  consumer price (IDR kg-1),
Y     =  national income per capita (IDR),
Z     =  consumer price of rice substitute (IDR kg-1),
PY = multiplication between Pd and Y, the shifting 
variable of demand,
PZ = multiplication between Pd and Z, the rotation 
variable of demand,
D   =  dummy variable of the governmental period, D = 
0 for 2001-2003; D = 1 for 2004-2014, 
α0  =  intercept, 
α
Pd
, αY, αZ, αPY, αPZ, αQd, αD  = estimated coefficients of 
the long-run parameters,  
Ut    =  error term,
Ɵ
Pd
, ƟY, ƟZ, ƟPY, ƟPZ = estimated coefficients of the 
short-run parameters,
γ    =  adjusted parameter from short-run to long-run, 
the estimated coefficient of the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) model.
∆Pst  =  β0 +  βQs ∆Qst  +  βW ∆Wt + λ∆Qt*  + 
β
Ps
∆Pst-1 +  ψ[Pst-1 – ξQsQst-1 – ξW Wt-1 – ΛQt-
1*] + βD Dt + Vt                             (4)
Qt*=    QstƟ
Pd
+ Ɵ
PY
 Yt + ƟPZ Zt                                                                                      (5)
Equation 4 is the dynamic-oligopoly rice supply model, 
while equation 5 is reflecting the relation between 
demand and supply response in the oligopolistic market, 
where:
Ps   =   producer price (IDR kg-1),
Qs  =   rice supply (kg),
W   =   rice milling cost (IDR kg-1),
D  = dummy variable representing the governmental 
period,
Fig. 1. Impact of price support policy on closed economy 
model (Johnson 1995).
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Vt   =  error term,
β0   =  intercept,
βQs, βW, λ, βPs, βD =  estimated coefficients of long-run 
parameters,
ξQs, ξW, Λ = estimated coefficients of  short-run 
parameters, 
ψ  =  adjusted parameter from short-run to long-run, 
the estimated coefficient of the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) model,
λ    =  long-run market power,
𝛬    =  short-run market power.
Following the estimation of rice demand and supply 
relation, price elasticity of rice demand was calculated 
using the formula developed by Steen and Salvanes 
(1999), while price elasticity of supply was computed 
using the equation developed by Zaini (2011) since Steen 
and Salvanes’ model did not provide it.
                              (6)
 
(7)
(8)
 (9)
Equation (6) is the short-run price elasticity demand of 
rice and equation (7) is the long-run price elasticity of 
demand. Meanwhile, equation (8) is the long-run price 
elasticity of supply and equation (9) is the long-run price 
elasticity of supply. 
Social Cost Estimation
Along with the implementation of price instrument 
policies, the government conducts import policy to fulfill 
the reserve stock. When the government does not apply 
import tariff, the domestic price will be similar to the 
world price (Pw = Pd), the domestic production is ab, the 
national consumption is ac, and the import volume is 
df (Figure 2b) or bc (Figure 2a). In terms of rice self-
sufficiency policy, the government applies import tariff 
(t) and import quota to provide price incentive to farmers 
to cultivate rice. Therefore, the domestic price increases 
from Pw to Pd.
Since the import tariff (t) and import quota applied, the 
national demand for imported rice shifts to the left from 
ED to ED*, crossing the supply curve (ES) at e (Figure 
2b). Hence, the volume of imported rice decreases from 
df to de and the Pd (Fig. 2a). The increasing domestic 
price will increase domestic production from ab to gh 
(Figure 2a), decrease consumption from ac to gj, and 
decrease import volume from bc to hj. On the other hand, 
the government receives revenue from the import tariff. 
It is represented by the dekl area (Figure 2b). Since the 
import quota is binding, therefore, the import volume is 
ED*. Seeing that the import policy is such a privilege 
for Bulog, thus the government will not receive more 
revenue from the import quota (Houck 1986). As a result 
of the two rice policies, the economic rent generates in 
the rice market, starting from the production side to the 
import side as follows (Jula and Buneci 2013): 
 
(10)
 
(11)
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Fig 2. Impact of import tariff and import quota on production (Houck 1986).
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Where TER is the total economic-rent or the value of 
social cost, Ps is the producer price, Pw is the import price, 
QS is the rice supply, M is the volume of imported rice, 
DWL is the welfare loss represented by the value of dead-
weight loss, ηSR is the elasticity of demand in the short-
run, and Qd is the rice demand. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Political Weight
The political weight of the vested-interest group in 
Indonesia rice market was calculated using Johnson 
(1995). The result showed that the government 
received the highest political weight, followed by 
the rice producer, then the rice consumer (Table 1). 
This result indicates that the implemented rice policy 
instruments are biased to the government rather 
than to the rice producer and consumer. It means 
that political preference of the government to Bulog 
is high. It proves that Bulog as the representative 
of the government received the highest political 
preference.
Price Elasticity
Based on the stationary test, the variable data were 
stationary in the forst different. These data were then 
tested in the integration order. Afterward, estimation 
of rice demand and supply relation was conducted to 
compute price elasticity of rice demand and supply 
using a dynamic-oligopoly model. Estimation of 
dynamic-oligopoly model of demand showed that 
the rice demand was inelastic (Table 2)  indicated 
by the price elasticity of demand (ηSR = -0.1122; 
η
LR
 = -0.1415). It emphasized that rice is the main 
staple food in Indonesia and could not be substituted 
by maize (αZ = -9.46E+08). Maize was being 
complement to rice. When the maize price increased, 
the rice demand decreased. This finding implied that 
food diversification programme from rice to non-
rice did not work well in the implementation.
Estimation of dynamic-oligopoly model of supply 
relation revealed that rice price was the only factor 
affecting farmers to cultivate rice. It was indicated by 
the short-run price supply elasticity, i.e. εSR = 1.4310 
(Table 3). Hence, rice production could increase and 
rice price might be profitable for the producer and 
payable for the consumer. The implemented rice 
policies in the rice market could be a mechanism of 
income transfer from the producers to the consumers 
through the price mechanism. 
Social Cost Estimation
In accordance with the implementation of rice self-
sufficiency programme, the Government of Indonesia 
allocated budget for food security programme. In the 
budget data, there was no specific closure mentioning 
rice self-sufficiency programme. However, most of 
expenditure was provided to support the achievement 
of rice self-sufficiency. Therefore, the budget of food 
security was then used for the approximation of budget 
of rice self-sufficiency programme. 
The government distributed the budget through two 
ministries, i.e. the Ministry of Public Work and Public 
Residence and the Ministry of Agriculture. The budget 
was grouped into three types, i.e. subsidy, government 
expenditure and transfer to the regional governments. 
The subsidy was provided in terms of food subsidies, 
fertilizer, seeds and credit interest. The government 
expenditure was provided in kind of government rice-
reserve stock, food stabilization reserve, national seed 
reserve and food security reserve. On the regional 
level, the budget was allocated for irrigation and other 
agricultural activities through the transfer mechanism. 
During the analysis period, the budget tended to 
increase from IDR 10.26 trillion in 2002 to more than 
IDR 67.78 trillion in 2014 (Appendix 1). It showed a 
positive growth rate of 18.36% per annum. On the other 
hand, the level of rice self-sufficiency ratio achieved 
0.99 (99%) on average and tended to decrease by 
0.02% per annum (Table 4). This findings showed that 
Indonesia faced an on-trend self-sufficiency. It indicated 
that import was taken place to fulfill the reserve stock 
and to meet the domestic demand. 
In the mean time, estimation of political economic 
function model showed that during the implementation 
of the price instrument policies and import policy, the 
economic rent and DWL generated considerably. The 
economic rent fluctuated between IDR 1.89 trillion 
and IDR 14.49 trillion, reached IDR 6.37 trillion on 
average, and tended to increase by 12.94% per annum 
during 2002–2014 (Table 1). The economic rent reached 
18.54% of the budget, but the proportion tended to 
decrease by 5.41% per annum during 2002–2014. In 
addition, the DWL fluctuated between IDR 0.09 trillion 
Table 1. The average political weight of vested interest groups in 
Indonesia rice market 
Vested interest group Political weight
Producer (W
P
) 0.5375 (17.67%)
Consumer (WC) 0.2324 (7.67%)
Government (WG) 2.2401 (74.67%)
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and IDR 2.72 trillion, reached IDR 0.90 trillion on 
average, and tended to increase by 16.94% per annum 
during 2002–2014 (Table 1). The DWL achieved 2.34% 
of the budget, though the proportion tended to decrease 
by 1.42% per annum during the analysis period.
Based on the summing up between the economic 
rent and the DWL, from 2002 to 2014, on average 
20.88% of the budget was lost and being the welfare 
lost and could not benefit neither the producers, the 
consumers, nor the tax payers in the rice market. 
It became the social cost of the rice-sufficiency 
programme. Nonetheless, troughout the analysis 
period the magnitude of the social cost tended to 
decrease by 4.84% per annum (Table 4). 
Table 2. Estimation result of dynamic-oligopoly demand function. 
Variable Parameter Coefficient St. Dev. t-Statistic Prob.
C α0 1.36E+10 2.78E+09 4.8957* 0.0163
∆Pdt αPd -6.10E+08 85245803 -7.1530** 0.0056
∆ Yt αY 722.0440 151.5221 4.7653* 0.0176
∆ Zt αZ -9.46E+08 1.96E+08 -4.8225* 0.0170
∆ PYt αPY -20.7517 3.218325 -6.4480** 0.0076
∆ PZt αPZ 26162996 5172820. 5.0578* 0.0149
∆ Qdt-1 αQd -1.7735 0.300563 -5.9006** 0.0097
D αD -2.30E+09 4.32E+08 -5.3178* 0.0130
Ut-1 γ -0.322197 0.094080 -3.4247* 0.0417
R-squared 0.9569
Long-run parameter
Pdt-1 ƟPd 7.14E+08
Y t-1 ƟY 246.1786
Z t-1 ƟZ 8.18E+08
PY t-1 ƟPY -1.7776
PZ t-1 ƟPZ -20584571
Elasticity
Short-run ηSR -0.1122
Long-run η
LR
-0.1415
*) Prob. < 0.90%; **) Prob. < 0.95%.
Table 3. Estimation result of dynamic-oligopoly supply function.
Variable Parameter Coefficient St. Dev. t-Statistic Prob.
∆Qst bQs 9.42E-10 1.39E-09 0.6753 0.5247
∆Wt bW -0.9351 0.9033 -1.0352 0.3405
∆Q*t λ -0.0003 0.0003 -0.9855 0.3624
∆Pst-1 bPs t-1 0.0657 0.3800 0.1729 0.8684
D bD 17.4824 10.9106 1.6023* 0.1602
Vt-1 Y -0.3040 0.1816 -1.6742* 0.1451
R-squared 0.4245
Long-run parameter 
Qst-1 ξQ 1.82E-09
W t-1 ξW -0.5341
Q* t-1 𝛬 -0.0003
Elasticity
Short-run εSR 1.4310
Long-run ε
LR
0.7406
*) Prob. < 90%.
83Political economic analysis of rice self-sufficiency… (Sri Nuryanti et al.)
This findings gave the proof of the aforementioned 
criticisms that Bulog involvement in the implementation 
of rice policies has distorted the rice market. The 
evidence of both economic rent and DWL proved the 
existing rent-seeking activities in the domestic rice 
market. Intervention of the government by involving 
Bulog to stabilize rice price and reserve stock, and to 
import rice resulted in market failure. It was indicated by 
the generation of economic rent and DWL. It proved that 
rice self-sufficiency programme is obviously a high-cost 
policy.
In view of the fact, the privilege of Bulog has 
transformed economic structure of rice market. It changed 
rice market structure systematically from a perfect 
competition to an oligopoly competition. The actual 
market structure of rice market in Indonesia seemed like 
a competitive market. It was indicated by the free-entry 
to and the free-exit from the market, many market players 
and homogenous products. Nonetheless, intervention of 
the government through the implementation of price 
policy and import policy distorted the domestic market. 
The market distortion might relate to the protection level, 
intensity of political activity of the vested interest groups 
in the market, and influencing capability of those groups 
to the government (Masters and Garcia 2009; Swinnen 
and Zee 1993).
From the national point of view, rice market was 
being the mean to achieve the government objectives. 
The government implemented such policies to protect 
either the producers or the consumers. The government 
established the market intervention to maintain the 
affordable price in the domestic market (Timmer 1986). 
Nonetheless, import was carried out to remedy the 
increasing price because of the decreasing supply in 
the domestic market. On the other hand, execution of 
the price instrument policy and import policy produced 
a zero sum outcome. The increasing income of the 
producers would be lost because the consumer had to 
pay the higher price (Timmer 2004). It showed that the 
price stabilization policy had an impact on the income 
distribution among the vested interest groups in the rice 
market. Rashid et al. (2007) revealed that involvement of 
parastatal in food grain market intervention was no longer 
convincing. The cost of parastatal-led price stabilization 
was staggering and the price policies were being dictated 
by special interests. Reduction of the intervention could 
promote competition, reduce subsidies and release funds 
for development and anti-poverty programs - all without 
jeopardizing price stability.
From the governmental point of view, price stabilization 
is crucially important. The hiking price might lead to high 
inflation and triggered the occurrence of social, economic 
and political issues. For that reason, the government 
countered the hiking price by conducting an ad hoc 
import policy to remedy the inflation. The quantification 
of price instrument policy and import policy in the 
political preferential function model could describe the 
result of the market intervention. Generation of social 
cost occurred at the equilibrium of political economy that 
involved relevant vested interest groups in the market. 
Table 4. The budget of food security, rice self-sufficiency ratio, economic rent and dead-weight loss, 2002–2014.
Year
Food security 
budget           
(IDR trillion)
Rice 
self-sufficiency 
ratio
Economic rent Dead weight loss
(IDR trillion) (% of budget) (IDR trillion) (% of budget)
2002 10.26 0.97 3.69 35.95 0.29 2.87
2003 13.47 0.98 3.71 27.55 0.51 3.78
2004 12.32 1.00 3.46 28.05 0.48 3.87
2005 13.17 1.00 1.89 14.33 0.09 0.72
2006 20.19 0.99 2.81 13.94 0.34 1.68
2007 27.75 0.97 6.22 22.42 0.70 2.52
2008 45.54 1.00 4.48 9.84 0.42 0.92
2009 52.74 1.00 4.29 8.13 1.79 3.40
2010 52.83 0.99 5.38 10.19 0.41 0.78
2011 60.76 0.95 9.82 16.16 0.62 1.02
2012 67.36 0.97 14.49 21.52 1.20 1.79
2013 68.62 1.00 12.97 18.90 2.72 3.97
2014 67.79 1.00 9.54 14.07 2.09 3.09
Average 39.44 0.99 6.37 18.54 0.90 2.34
% per annum 18.36 0.02 12.94 -5.41 16.94 -1.42
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Rice producer, the government and Bulog received 
the generated economic rent. Rice producers received 
economic rent in terms of financial profit of trading 
activity. The government received revenue from the 
import tariff. While Bulog received economic rent 
from the existing price gaps between producer price 
and governmental procurement price and between 
consumer price and import price. Nonetheless, most 
of the rice producers were smallholders (Masyhuri and 
Novia 2014), which their number was equivalent to 
around 15 million households (Anggoro 2014). They 
worked on a hectare or less of holding size (Masyhuri 
and Novia 2014; Suryana et al. 2001). Makbul et al. 
(2015) found that the market for small farmers was not 
a free and competitive market, but a monopsony, in 
which increases in rice prices would not increase their 
income. Moreover, around 70% of farmers were landless 
(Suryana et al. 2001) and being the net consumer of rice 
that counted for 60% of total population of Indonesia 
(Hariyadi and Yamin 2014).
From the discussion above, it showed that the rice 
market failure was obviously caused by the nature of 
the market and the atomistic decision making, i.e. top-
down rice policy from the central government to the 
regional governments. Hai and Talbot (2013) showed 
that food price policies also distorted market prices in 
any countries. In some cases, distortionary policies were 
defensible on the grounds of equity or food security; in 
others, those created opportunities for rent extraction. 
The rice price stabilization was good when the price 
movements could motivate the producers to cultivate 
rice and improve purchasing power of the consumers. 
One way to increase producers’ incomes was to increase 
rice price. This was based on the assumption that 
increase in rice price would subsequently increase paddy 
price, which, in turn, improve farmers’ income (Makbul 
et al. 2015). The more available rice in the market would 
provide more affordable price to the consumer.
The import policy could increase producers’ distress, 
especially among the marginal and smallholders. Along 
with the economic liberalization, farm mechanization, 
increased share of purchased inputs, price fluctuation 
and higher wage rate would increase vulnerability of 
the smallholders than the large farmers (Reddy and 
Amarender 2015). Therefore, in case of regionality, the 
government should consider disparities in profitability of 
rice production. On the other hand, the role of rice as the 
staple food of most of the population of Indonesia urged 
the government to determine the affordable rice price 
for the consumer. The expensive price was seemingly 
associated with the more important off-farm food sector 
in particular, milling, retailing and branding (Minten et 
al. 2013). Those implied that improvement of income 
distribution between rice producers and consumer should 
be conducted from on-farm to off-farm.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of price instrument policy and import 
policy by Bulog had an impact on the market failure, 
evidenced by the generation of economic rent and dead-
weight loss. Bulog involvement in rice self-sufficiency 
programme obviously distorted rice market and caused 
welfare lost. This evidence proved the criticisms that rice 
self-sufficiency is economically inefficient related to the 
social cost generation. 
The government should review the price and import 
policies to remedy market failure. It is crucially necessary 
to reduce social cost due to the implementation of price 
policy and import policy by Bulog. The government is 
suggested to orientate income distribution rather than 
price stabilization. It is urgently required to provide 
and improve irrigation facilities, agricultural roads, 
postharvest technologies and marketing infrastructure. 
Those operational policies may not only reduce income 
risk of the producers, but also improve purchasing power 
of the consumers. Since import was the one of economic-
rent sources, hence, it is suggested to be stopped. 
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